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Introduction
Central governments, all over the world, often introduce flagship public schemes that not only have large budgetary outlays, but lead people to identify the scheme with a particular political regime. For example, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, is often identified with the Lula administration and is believed to have resulted in his victory in presidential elections in 2006. Similarly, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which guarantees 100 days of employment to rural households in India, is a flagship program of the Indian National Congress party (INC) and was touted to be one of the main reasons for INC getting re-elected to the central government in 2009.
In the context of developing countries, the NREGS is an interesting experiment in policy implementation since it requires active participation of elected local representative bodies in rural areas (called the panchayati raj institutions: PRI). While such decentralization, in principle, may lead to better implementation, it also lends itself to local capture. These can often take the shape of elites getting disproportionate share of benefits from a scheme, especially when the beneficiaries are uninformed about the scheme (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000) . At the same time, policy implementation can also be a §ected by local political competition: in particular competition between parties in local elections. Political will to implement the scheme can, in principle, be driven by ideologies of parties (as captured by Candidate-Citizen models of Besley and Coate, 1997) . However, recent evidence finds that political opportunism can often dictate how policies get implemented. For example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) , in the context of West Bengal in India, finds that areas which are subject to close legislative assembly elections often see better implementation of land reforms. They find that the relation between implementation and political strength (in terms of seats) is an inverted U, with parties not caring about policy implementation if they have a very low or very high representation in an assembly constituency.
In the context of NREGS, there is no major ideological di §erence between the major parties about the scheme per se 1 ; the di §erence in posture, if any, has more to do with the fact that the rural polity may identify the scheme with INC since it is one of its flagship programs. This may decrease the will of other political parties to implement the scheme. This leakage of benefits (or lack of it) when parties implement policies has been studied in the context of centre-state transfers. For example, Arulampalam et al. (2009) study the impact of national and 1 The major parties of India are largely left of centre, especially in the context of the rural economy.
The differences in rhetoric come largely from posturing during elections.
For an interesting take on this issue, refer to http://debrajray.blogspot.in/2013/08/namomania.html state assembly compositions on centre-state transfers. In their context, the goodwill from centre to state transfers is lost to "leakage" if the government at the state and centre are from di §erent parties. This a §ects the transfers the centre is willing to make to the state. The case of NREGS is similar. While the scheme is largely funded by the centre, the funds are channelled through local bodies that may have key political personnel who are not aligned to the party at the centre. Hence, this paper explores whether the funds allocated at the local level are a §ected by local political competition.
The analysis presented in the paper uses data from two panchayat samiti elections ( There is however no significant relationship between the vote share of BJP and funds allocated pointing out that BJP may not find it optimal or may not have the capability (key political personnel) to use strategies analogous to INC.
Our results on political opportunism imply that more funds are allocated around the mean vote share of INC (44 percent). To characterize further the political economy link, we focus on a subset of close elections over the two elections (2005 and 2010). Close elections are defined in terms of vote margins of no more than 4 percent di §erence between the vote share of INC (BJP) and the closest rival. 3 We find that, for close elections, the relationship between INC vote share and funds is di §erent. On an average, more funds are allocated to blocks where the vote share of INC is below the mean than above it. For example, the funds allocated to blocks where INC has a vote share of 30 percent is around 1.5 times larger than the funds allocated when the vote share is 50 percent. This 2 A block is roughly the same as a panchayat samiti. We consider the set of panchayat samitis that correspond to blocks. Hence, we refer to them interchangebly in this paper.
3 4% is the lowest margin di §erence we can use for this paper due to sample size issues. We also provide some suggestive evidence that the INC strategy may have been ex-post rational. Using data from 2010 elections, we show that NREGS funds had a positive e §ect on vote shares of INC but not of BJP.
The paper contributes to three strands of the literature: It contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of local political competition on public policy implementation. It gives further evidence that political opportunism guides how parties act on policies. After 2008, INC was in power both at the centre and the state. Hence, we are able to abstract away from any centre-state issues and focus narrowly on local elections. 4 This analysis is also unique in that we consider fund flow for a policy at the block level. Similar information at this level of disaggregation for implementation of policies are tough to get, especially in developing countries. What is also useful about this exercise is that it is clear how political parties can a §ect outcomes, since political appointees have a declared role in fund allocation decisions.
These results are in contrast to empirical results that find evidence of political patronage in local politics (Besley et al. 2004 ). This paper is similar in spirit to Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) in so far as we estimate a similar inverted U shaped relationship between political variables and the outcome. However, the di §erential relationship within close elections is unexplored in their analysis. These results are also in contrast to the literature that points out that pre-election transfer of funds are only useful in getting voters to election booths and not for a §ecting their voting choice (Cox and Kousser 1981) .
The second strand of literature for which this paper is relevant is the role of local politics in a §ecting economic 4 are besotted with identification issues since the intensity of the program in any area and over time is not random.
In providing a political explanation for funds allocated, this paper provides a potential identification channel to examine its impact. 5 In section 2, we describe the institutional setting of funds allocation across administrative units and how they are related to the local political structure. Section 3 provides description of the data. In section 4, we lay out an empirical model and describe variables used in a multivariate panel regression model. Further, we describe our identification strategy. Section 5 describes results while section 6 o §ers an explanation for the results obtained.
We conclude in section 7.
Institutional Setting
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) provides a legal guarantee for atleast one hundred The legal entitlement of work implies that NREGS is, in principle, a demand based scheme. Thus, various 5 Needless to say, this is contextual, as for many outcome variables, the exclusion criterion may not be met if political competition a §ects them directly. While fund allocations may not be completely demand driven, it is implausible to think that they are random.
Given the various levels of local political institutions involved in the collation of demand requests, it is possible that they can influence the funds that are finally allocated. While there can be political forces at play that decide funds at the district level and at the state level, we focus, in this paper, on the intra district allocation of funds (that is, to blocks). 10 Further, we look at the relationship between vote share of each party in Panchayat Samiti 6 The Block Development O¢cer (BDO) is often appointed the program o¢cer. The Program O¢cer provides preliminary approval based on verification of maintenance of 60:40 ratio of wage to materials in terms of cost. 7 Most Panchayat Samitis map on perfectly to a census unit called block. A district is a collection of blocks. 8 The elected heads of Gram Panchayats are also members of Panchayat Samitis. In contrast to members elected directly into the council, they have no declared party a¢liation. 9 This is based on a focus group discussion in each village. 10 Once funds are approved for Gram Panchayats, there can be further local political forces at play. For example, Himanshu et al. 6 elections to subsequent block level approved funds. Panchayat Samiti elections are the lowest tier of local elections, for which vote shares are recorded party wise (by the state election commission). 11 In addition, we look at the influence of the MP, who is member of the district panchayat, a body that finally approves block plans. 12 While other layers of politics can matter for allocation of funds under NREGS, what makes the particular context we examine useful, is that the political structure at higher tiers of governance stayed the same during the period of our study. Both the central government and the state governments were headed by the same party: INC.
Data & Descriptives
This analysis uses data from Rajasthan, a northern state of India. Rajasthan is touted as a success story in terms of the implementation of the scheme since funds have been used to provide employment in this state, in contrast to other states of India, where its implementation has been poor. 13 We seek to investigate whether NREGS fund allocation to blocks, in a financial year, depend on the existing vote share of each political party within the panchayat samiti electorate. 14 year for which we have data for all districts (and blocks). 15 The choice of 2012-2013 was dictated by the fact, that given the complicated machinery of NREGS, it is plausible that it would take time for the newly elected local politicians to learn about how NREGS funding works. Indeed, 2010-2011 showed a sharp dip in total NREGS (2013) find, that in multi-village Gram panchayats, the village of the head of the Gram Panchayat (called the Sarpanch) gets more NREGS work. 11 These elections are the lowest tier where candidates can declare parties. While elected leaders at lower levels of governance (head of Gram Panchayats) often have party a¢liations, these are informal and never o¢cially declared. 12 We do not look at the party composition of the district panchayat since the members are elected at the same time as the panchayat samiti members. The MP is elected through a national election which was held earlier. 13 The total funds for Rajasthan for the years 2009 and 2012 were Rs. 82027.25 million and Rs 37757.78 million respectively. The state government, in many press releases, has claimed that there is decreasing demand for NREGS which needs to be investigated. The drop in over all funds for NREGS in Rajasthan has also been noted by Mukhopadhyay (2012) . 14 We choose to look at fund allocations instead of expenditures because the latter is subject to issues of corruption and village politics, issues which are not relevant for testing our hypothesis. 15 While the total number of votes for each party from each ward are not reported, the over all votes for each party for the entire panchayat samiti are recorded. 20 We divide the votes a party gets by the total number of votes cast to calculate a party's vote share. As can be seen, there is fair heterogeneity in vote share for both years. It is also important for our analysis that even within a district, there is fair degree of heterogeneity across blocks in vote share. The striped portions reflect blocks where the INC vote margin was less than equal to 4 percent. As can be gleaned from the figures, close elections are not concentrated in any particular region. A comparison of F igures 1 and 2 also shows that the vote shares have temporal variation. 21 The block level funds are matched to panchayat samiti vote shares. As noted before, we are able to match 16 The proportion of Outstanding balance to total funds was 0.22 and 0.19 for the years 2009 and 2012 respectively. 17 http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx 18 There are 248 blocks in total. We drop blocks which could not be mapped onto panchayati samitis, the area delimited for election purposes.
19 http://www.rajsec.rajasthan.gov.in 20 The Panchayat Samiti is, anyways, the level of aggregation relevant for block level funds. 21 INC is relatively weaker in the north eastern blocks. However, even there, there is intra district variation in vote shares of INC. 8 these perfectly for 219 blocks and use this subsample for our analysis. The unconditional correlation between INC vote share and funds, after pooling the data for the two years, is 0.28 while that for BJP vote share and funds is much weaker at 0.13. However, these correlations could also be driven by other factors: those that a §ect the household demand for work. Intra-district analysis alleviates some of these concerns. The presence of confounding factors, however requires that we model the correlation between funds and vote share in a multivariate framework.
The data on demographic variables are sourced from Census 2001 and 2011. Rainfall data is available only at the district level and is sourced from the Indian Meteorological Department. The descriptive statistics for these variables are summarized in T able 1.A for all panchayat samitis and in T able 1.B for panchayat samitis that had close elections.
Empirical Model and Identification
Our main hypothesis is that, controlling for other factors that a §ect demand for funds, political competition has a role to play in fund allocations across blocks. To eliminate the impact of demand on NREGS funds, we control for variables that may a §ect the demand.
We posit that the demand for NREGS funds depends on rainfall shock (rain_dev dt ) as NREGS has been put in place to mitigate e §ects of droughts. Moreover, funds allocated may depend on the population of a block pop pdt .
One would expect more funds would be allocated to areas where there was a higher proportion of the relatively less prosperous communities. Hence the proportion of Scheduled Castes (SC pdt ) and Scheduled Tribes (ST pdt )
in the block are included as control variables. Moreover, the labor force participation of women in NREGS has been huge in Rajasthan. Hence we include the proportion of females in the population (fem pdt ) as a explanatory variable. Further, to measure underdevelopment at the block level, which may lead to a higher NREGS demand, we take into account the illiteracy rate ILL pdt .
To alleviate concerns that unobserved variables may influence fund allocations, we include panchayat samiti dummy variables (δ pd ) to take into account panchayat samiti idiosyncrasies, for example, its geographic location.
Moreover, we allow for a secular trend (δ t ) to take into account falling funds for NREGS in Rajasthan. We also include district trends (ρ dt ) over the period to take into account trends in alternative employment opportunities (wages) at the district level. In addition we allow for a trend that depends on a development index for a block (Infra pd0 ) 22 and another trend that depends on the amount of irrigated land within a block (Irr pd0 ). Both these variables are measured in 2001 and reflect base values. 23 . Hence the empirical model we estimate is:
where Z is a vector that includes all the other control variables.
To estimate this model, we use a balanced panel of blocks and apply a fixed e §ects estimator. This eliminates 22 Inf ra pd0 is created using principle component analysis taking into account Average No of Schools per village, Proportion of Villages with power supply, Proportion of villages with a medical facility. 23 The data for these variables are sourced from 2001 census. Similar data are not available currently for the 2011 census at the block level.
the panchayat samiti time invariant idiosyncrasies. It also eliminates rainfall shock, as that is measured at the district level, and is therefore collinear with the district trend. The district trend also eliminates the need to include district funds as a variable . We are then interested in examining the sign and statistical significance of Next we look at close elections. The dynamics of close elections may be very di §erent to the over all elections.
Voters in close elections are less likely to be biased towards one party than the other and hence it may be more plausible that funds may be used to influence voters. Hence the correlation between vote shares and funds may be di §erent to the overall result. We define a close election for INC as one where INC won or lost by a margin of less than 4 percentage points. The sample of close elections is however unbalanced and it is not practical to run fixed e §ects models on a balanced panel. 25 . We therefore estimate this model using a random e §ects model. In this formulation, we do not instrument the variables since the actual proportion for INC (and BJP) can be taken to quasi-random. However, it is possible that the probability of a panchayat samiti having a close election is a function of funds (in particular for 2010 elections) which would lead to a sample selection bias. To show that this is not the case, for 2010, we run a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the panchayat samiti had close elections and 0 otherwise. After controlling for all the confounding factors, we test whether funds in 2009 a §ect the probability of close elections.
Analogous to the above specifications with IN C, we estimate models where the IN C_voteshare is replaced by BJP _voteshare. To maintain comparability, close elections are defined in terms of victory and loss margins 24 The BJP and INC compete for all Panchayat Samiti elections in 2005 and 2010. However, in the 2000 elections, there are some panchayat samitis that they do not figure in. It is therefore likely that INC and BJP entered into pre poll alliances with some parties/independents and therefore it would be incorrect to assume that the vote share for them is zero. We drop these panchayat samitis in our 2 SLS regressions and hence our sample size drops to 213 for INC and 205 for BJP. 25 A balanced panel would leave us with only 62 observations.
for BJP.
Next, we test the hypothesis if key political appointees matter for funds sanction within close elections. We focus on the district panchayat, which finally approves block plans. The MP is a member of the district panchayat which, together with the administrative o¢cer, approves block level fund allocations. We construct a variable:
IN C_MP which takes the value 1 if the district MP is from IN C, 0 otherwise. 26 Thus, we modify equation (1) to include this variable by interacting it with the linear and quadratic terms of IN C_voteshare 27 . Thus:
We estimate a similar regression for BJP _MP.
Standard errors reported are robust and are clustered at the block level. 28 
Results
To begin with, we present results from a pooled OLS regression with and without district trend ( T able 2; Columns funds are available where the vote share of INC in the panchayat samiti constituency (block) is low. While the square term is positive (though insignificant), a marginal e §ects calculation yields the result that the marginal e §ect is significant (at 10 percent) and negative when IN C_voteshare is less than 36.5 percent (pooling over the two years, this forms around 25 percent of the sample). This implies higher funds are available in places where INC has very low vote share from previous elections. The coe¢cient of total number of wards in a panchayati samiti (wards) is positive and significant. However, as we have pointed out above, these results may be biased.
Hence we instrument IN C_voteshare and it's square by it's lagged value and it's square. This yields a inverted U shape for the e §ect of INC vote share on funds (column 3). 29 The linear term is positive and significant while the quadratic term is negative and significant. To understand the implication of these coe¢cients on funds, let us fix as a benchmark, the average funds when the IN C_voteshare is 64 percent and above (at which point the marginal e §ect becomes insignificant). Now, we calculate the funds at other levels of vote shares, as a proportion of this benchmark. This proportion reaches a maximum at around 35 percent where it almost 5 times higher than the benchmark ( F igure 3).
To identify the impact of other variables, it is perhaps more intuitive to look at columns ( Next we ask if the results change if we replace IN C by BJP . In the cross sectional regression (T able 3;
Columns 1 and 2), the coe¢cients of BJP _voteshare on funds is insignificant though the marginal e §ect is significant above 22 %. However as soon as we move to any specification with fixed e §ects and trends, the marginal e §ect is insignificant at any value of BJP vote share.(T able 3 and Appendix T able 2). To investigate this further, we delve deeper into a mechanism that may drive this result. For this, we look at the results from estimating equation (3) . Recall that, we seek to test whether INC are able to implement their strategies depends on whether the district MP, a key political personnel, who is also responsive for approving block level plans, is from INC. T able 4 (Column 2) reports the results while T able 5 reports the marginal e §ects.
It is clear to see that when the MP is not from INC, the coe¢cients of IN C_voteshare and its square are always insignificant. The implied marginal e §ects are also insignificant at all values of IN C_voteshare (T able 5). However, when the district head is from INC, the marginal e §ects of IN C_voteshare are similar to what is obtained above: they are negative and significant. As F igure 5 shows, the e §ects are exaggerated when the MP is from INC as compared to the over all e §ects (that is denoted by the dashed line). Now the funds are almost 4 times higher when the vote share is 30 percent. The patronage is also higher with the funds at 50 percent almost twice as compared to benchmark funds.
Interestingly, in the case of BJP we observe a similar shape when the district MP is from the BJP. The 30 Similar concerns have often being raised when RDD methods are applied to political economy problems. 31 The choice of the range 30 to 50 is based on the empirical vote share for close seats.
negative relation between vote share and funds are significant between 38 and 42 percent vote share for BJP.
However, like INC, the relationship is insignificant when the MP is not from BJP.
Discussion of Results
In the previous section we find two kinds of results: those for all seats and those for close elections. The results for all the seats echoes the results obtained by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) in the context of land reforms in West Bengal. Clearly, if a party is very weak in a particular area or very strong, a party may not find it optimal to influence fund allocations to those areas. Instead it may aim to deliver funds towards areas where the polity does not take extreme ideological positions. These results can be motivated through a quasi-Downsian model as postulated by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) . However, our second result points out that within areas with close elections (that is, a subset of areas where polity does not take extreme ideological positions), the correlations may be di §erent. It may be beneficial to transfer higher funds to where it got more than average vote share, as a reward to people who voted for it in close elections. But there is also a component of vote buying by transferring funds to where it got less than average votes. Recall that these are close seats; hence it is not prohibitively costly to "buy" these votes. This is in contrast to over all results where it may be too costly to influence voters where vote shares are very low. This suggests that the fund allocation is influenced by INC political objectives.
To examine this further, we focus on whether the implied strategy by INC was ex-post e §ective. 
where 0 refers to the period before the 2010 election. Since the regression allows for district fixed e §ects (ρ d ),we investigate if within a district, higher funds to a block leads to higher value of prop pd . Moreover, we allow the marginal e §ect of funds to depend on the initial vote share IN C_voteshare pd0 . The results (T able 6; column (1)) indicate that higher block funds lead to a larger increase in vote share in 2010 elections relative to the previous election. Moreover the e §ect of funds is largest when the IN C_voteshare pd0 is lower. One standard deviation higher funds increases prop by 0.28 when IN C_voteshare is equal to 20 percent.
To complete the narrative, one needs to reconcile why we don't observe results similar to IN C for BJP. As has been suggested, there are two reasons why we might not see results for the rival party. First, it may not be optimal for BJP to use funds from NREGS since it is primarily thought of us as a central government scheme.
Hence there may be leakage of goodwill that defeats the purpose of using these funds to influence voters. Second, even if BJP may want to allocate funds according to a strategy similar to INC, it may not be able to do so unless there is alignment of interest. In particular, the result that marginal e §ects are only significant when the MP is from BJP suggests that having key personnel is an important part of the story. This point is echoed even in the case of INC where the marginal e §ects are only significant when the MP is from INC.
The result that we do not observe any result when we focus on BJP is again borne out when we test for the ex post e §ect of funds on BJP vote share. The coe¢cient is insignificant.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence on how political competition a §ects implementation of policies. We use the particular context of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in Rajasthan, a state in India.
This scheme was introduced by the Indian National Congress(INC). Using panel data techniques and instrumenting for endogenous vote share by its lagged value, we show that the relationship at the block level, between vote share of INC in elections and the subsequent fund allocations is concave (inverted U shaped). In contrast, funds are invariant to the vote shares of the biggest rival party. Results however, di §er when we consider close elections, that is, the sample of blocks, where INC won or lost closely. We find that though there is some evidence of patronage, larger funds were sanctioned in areas with relatively lower vote shares . We o §er alternate explanations for these results in terms of incentives of parties to implement the scheme, as well as, the capacity to be able to do so. In doing so, this paper points out to the potential problems of implementing public work schemes through a decentralized mechanism which involves political players. 
